This paper utilizes a unique comprehensive dataset, drawn from the 1999 baseline survey of some 2000 micro and small-scale enterprises (MSEs) in Kenya. We analyse the financing behaviour of these enterprises within the framework of a heterodox model of debt-equity and gearing decisions. We also study determinants of the success rate of loan applications. Our results emphasize three major findings. First, MSEs in Kenya obtain debt from a wide variety of sources. Second, debt-equity and gearing decisions by MSEs and their success rates in loan applications can all be understood by relatively simple models which include a mixture of conventional and heterodox variables. Third, and in particular, measures of the tangibility of the owner's assets, and the owner's education and training have a significant positive impact on the probability of borrowing and of the gearing level. These findings have important policy implications for policy-makers and entrepreneurs of MSEs in Kenya.
Introduction
Considerable attention has been paid in the last decade to the problem of poverty-reduction in developing countries. (World Bank, 1989 , 1997 It is generally agreed that the development of micro and small scale enterprises (MSEs) can be a key ingredient in poverty-reduction (Sen, 1980) . However, MSEs generally suffer from a range of problems in their establishment and development. Among these problems, we would argue that finance is perhaps the most central.
A recent World Bank study found that about 90 per cent of small enterprises surveyed stated that credit was a major constraint to new investment (Parker, Riopelle and Steel, 1995) . A priori, it might seem surprising that finance should be so important. Requirements such as identifying a product and a market, acquiring any necessary property rights or licenses, and keeping proper records are all in some sense more fundamental to running a small enterprise than is finance. However, potential providers of finance, whether formal or informal, are unlikely to commit funds to a business which they view as not being on a sound footing, irrespective of the exact nature of the unsoundness. Lack of funds may therefore be the immediate reason for a business failing to start or to progress, even when the more fundamental reason lies elsewhere. In this sense therefore, we would argue that finance is the "glue" that holds together all the diverse aspects involved in a small business start-up and development. Cook and Nixson (2000) have recently surveyed the literature on finance for MSEs. They observe that most extant research on MSEs is concerned with the industrial countries. There is much less literature on developing countries, in part because basic data availability is much sparser. They identify several key research questions which require investigation. Among these they particularly note that little is known about the relationships between the financing of MSEs and their ownership characteristics, size, and performance.
In this paper we take up the question of how finance is related to other aspects of small business. Specifically, we study the determinants of probably the most important financial decision of MSEs, that of how to raise capital for the business, distinguishing between the initial capital and any follow-up capital acquired for expansion or restructuring. We examine this decision in the context of a large sample of MSEs in Kenya. Kenya's small enterprise sector forms an important part of the economy and available data suggests that, in the recent past, it has grown faster than the larger organized sector (Aboagye, 1986) . Moreover, small enterprises tend to be more labour-intensive than large enterprises (Snodgrass and Biggs, 1995) . Thus, a lot is expected of Kenya's MSEs in the fight against poverty and there is considerable interest in research that can enlarge the pool of information to help inform policy towards MSEs. More precisely, in our research, we seek to identify first, the factors which lead Kenyan MSEs to borrow, whether from formal or informal sources, as against using equity; second, the determinants of the gearing rate which they actually employ; and third, the determinants of their success rate in applying for loans.
To analyse the financing behaviour of small enterprises in Kenya we set up and test an eclectic but heterodox empirical model of the capital structure and financial decisions of MSEs. The model is heterodox because it includes a wide range of variables not typically included in conventional financial models. See Prasad, Green and Murinde (2001) for a survey of such conventional models. In the first part of the analysis, we use the full sample of firms in our dataset to investigate the determinants of MSEs' debt-equity decisions, which we study using a binary choice model. We hypothesize that heterodox factors will be important in determining whether or not MSEs are able to get a loan to start up their business, and further that heterodox factors may decrease in importance as the business gets established and seeks further capital.
Heterodox factors include inter alia variables representing ownership, the market, and the education, property rights and book-keeping skills of the owners and managers. Thus the analysis also explores the relationship between the "glue" of finance and the component parts of the businesses which we conjecture are held together by this glue.
In the second part of the analysis we use the full sample of data to examine the determinants of gearing, ie. the ratio of outstanding debt to debt-plus-equity. In theory, we would expect these determinants to be broadly similar to those of the gearing decisions for initial and additional capital examined in the first part of the analysis.
Third, we turn more specifically to debt decisions. It transpires that only a small number of MSEs in the dataset (exactly 100) did in fact apply for a loan to finance their capital in the recent past. We therefore study this sub-sample directly, and model the determinants of the "success rate" in the debt market, ie. the ratio of the loan received by a firm to the amount for which it applied 1 .
Our dataset permits a much broader analysis of these issues than is usually possible. We rely on a unique comprehensive dataset, which contains a vast amount of information about the financing behaviour of MSEs in Kenya. Drawn from the 1999 baseline survey of MSEs in Kenya, the dataset consists of 2000 businesses, which form the basis for the analysis reported in this paper. The data, which we describe in more detail below, consist of answers to a wide range of qualitative and quantitative questions put to MSEs during 1999. The data do not include detailed accounting information, but they do include numerous other indicators of the nature of each business and its financial, operating, and ownership characteristics.
In summary, this paper includes a number of important innovations. First, in the dataset we use; second, in the application of a heterodox model of financial decisions; third, in the examination of the differences in decision-making between new and established businesses;
and fourth, in a systematic study of the determinants of the success rates of loan applications by small businesses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly describe the MSE sector in Kenya and the survey data which we use in our analysis. Section 3 sets out the model and the empirical methods we use to analyse these data. Section 4 contains the main empirical results. Concluding remarks appear in section 5.
Kenya's Micro and Small Enterprise Sector

MSEs in Kenya
Early research treated small enterprises as peripheral survival mechanisms whose developmental impact was marginal (Ongile and McCormick, 1996) . This view was irrevocably changed by the 1972 International Labour Organisation report that demonstrated the significant employment and wealth creation potential of the burgeoning, and often informal, small enterprise sector (ILO, 1972) . Since the ILO report, the general outlook towards MSEs has shifted dramatically. Benign neglect has been replaced by a recognition that the sector could be the lynchpin for improving economic prospects in the developing world (King, 1996) . But the shift after the 1970s also benefitted from a heightened realisation that a high and rising share of industrial employment was still in the small enterprise sector. Previous slanting of government policies towards promotion of large, capital intensive industry meant that the potential for inducing more efficient use of capital and improving income distribution lay in more neutral policies. MSEs also link closely with agriculture so that their promotion would be part of an agriculture-led development strategy. As compared with large enterprises,
MSEs are invariably more labour-intensive and often more efficient. Indeed, labour-intensive production tends to be more efficient where labour is plentiful and capital scarce, which is freque ntly the case in developing countries (Snodgrass and Biggs, 1995) . MSEs promote more equitable distribution of income because they are more labour-intensive than larger enterprises, and because owners of small businesses are more likely to be poorer than the owners of large businesses. Small enterprises also nurture entrepreneurs who may eventually expand their firms and move to high value adding activities.
The Kenyan MSE sector is mixture of self-employment outlets and dynamic enterprises involved in an array of activities that are concentrated in urban areas but are also evident in rural Kenya. There are about 1.3 million establishments employing 2.3 million individuals and generating as much as 14% of the country's GDP (Mullei & Bokea, 1999) . A majority of these small enterprises are sole proprietorships; a third of the enterprises operate from homes; and one half are female-owned. According to recent research, female-owned small enterprises are more likely to be informal, usually start smaller, use less start-up capital, grow slower if at all, have more limited access to credit and more often operate from less permanent premises and homes (Parker & Torres 1994 , Kimuyu & Omiti 2000 .
Through the small enterprise sector, unskilled rural migrants acquire skills needed for survival in the more challenging urban environment. The sector also attracts skilled persons retrenched from formal sector jobs, and is often regarded as a second-best option for those unable to find or to keep jobs in the modern sector. The size of an MSE's total labour force varies widely across business establishments and activities. However, the two key components of the labour force are entrepreneurs and apprentices. Informal garages absorb appreciably more apprentices and workers than the formal service sector that is dominated by proprietors. In the recent past, employment growth in Kenya's small enterprise sector has far outpaced growth in the larger modern sector (Aboagye, 1986) . However, many MSEs still require workers with skills that school leavers often lack, and therefore the small enterprise sector is not likely to solve Kenya's daunting unemployment problem on its own (Ongile and McCormick, 1996) .
Although most small enterprises are younger than the large ones, their ages vary across locations and activities. For the informal small businesses, the first two years are critical for survival since mortality rates are highest around this age. In many sectors, lack of entry barriers creates severe competition that leads to the demise of the less efficient and poorly managed enterprises. However, there are higher capital and skill requirements in construction and vehicle garages, and these act as effective entry barriers so that there is less competition in these sub-sectors.
The National Sample Survey and Evaluation Programme
This paper uses data from the 1999 baseline survey of micro and small scale enterprises in Kenya. The baseline survey was based on a survey that drew from the Central Bureau of Statistics' Natio nal Sample Survey and Evaluation Programme (NASSEP) III sampling frame.
The selection of clusters followed a primary stratification that distinguished between different households based on economic and demographic characteristics. The Kenya Governement (1993) reports information about the 1993 survey. Results from this survey were used to determine sample sizes in each stratum while area maps were used to determine the enumeration areas. In the end, a total of 1500 households were sampled. All adult me mbers of the households on the survey sites were interviewed using a structured questionnaire and the module for information on enterprises administered on households with non-agricultural businesses. These procedures generated a sub-sample of about 2000 businesses whose data are used in the analysis reported in this paper. Table 1 __________________________________________________________________________ Table 2 summarizes the main quantitative data on the overall gearing rates of firms in the sample. Gearing is defined as the ratio of total debt to total debt-plus-equity, where the total is defined to include both initial and additional capital. There is an ambiguity in the gearing measure in that it is not clear from the context of the questions whether firms would necessarily include loans taken out in the last 12 months within their debt total. This would depend in part on when the last accounts were struck from which, formally or informally, firms were reporting the value of their debt and equity. As can be seen from Table 2 __________________________________________________________________________ Table 3 shows the success rates of those firms which did apply for a loan during the year preceeding the survey. Two points are worth noting from these data. First, it would appear that where credit rationing occurs, there are almost as many instances of "all-or-nothing" rationing as there are of partial rationing: 19 enterprises got no credit, while 22 received some credit, but not all they had applied for. The theory of credit rationing generally suggests that a reduction in the size of the loan (rather than an outright refusal) is an effective screening device for lenders. See Freixas and Rochet (1998) for a review. Of course, the enterprises which were refused credit may also have had insufficient collateral or other observable charactersitics leading to refusal of the loan. A second tentative conclusion is that borrowers had more success with co-operatives than with any other form of institutional lender. It is particularly noteworthy that applicants to Rotating Credit Societies (ROSCAs) had a lower success rate.
ROSCAs are usually thought of as having particularly good knowledge about their members.
These data suggests that there may be important differences in credit-granting capabilities and policies among different micro-credit institutions. See Morduch (1999) for a review of these issues. However, we would re-emphasize that this sample is too small for us to draw more than tentative conclusions at this stage. Table 3 __________________________________________________________________________ 3. The models
__________________________________________________________________________
Debt v Equity
In a recent survey of the literature on capital structure in developing economies, Prasad, Green and Murinde (2001) evaluate a range of competing models for studying capital structure issues.
In the light of these models and in view of the features of MSEs in Kenya, we specify the following general model:
? ?
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The endogenous variable, y n (n = 1,...,N), is a measure of the main source of capital of the nth MSE. The X kn (k = 1,…,K) are company-specific explanatory variables, and e n is the error term. The endogenous variable is binary and is defined as:
As shown in table 1 "equity" is defined as own or non-interest-bearing family funds; "debt" includes all other sources of funds. Thus the model seeks to explain the debt-equity decision by MSEs; and equation (1) could be interpreted loosely as a (binary) demand function for debt.
We set up our heterodox model with explanatory variables (X k ) discussed below. Equation (1) was then estimated twice: first to explain the initial capital decision, and second to explain the decision on additional capital. To economise on space we call these the IC and AC regressions, respectively. At the first stage, we used the same explanatory variables in the two regressions. We then used t-tests and likelihood ratio tests to compare the coefficients in the two regressions, and to test the hypothesis that there would be differences between the factors determining the IC decision and those determining the AC decision. We also tested down to delete insignificant variables wherever possible. Since y n is a binary variable, we used the probit method to estimate (1). Table 4 __________________________________________________________________________ The explanatory variables of the model are shown in table 4, together with their definitions and hypothesized signs in the regression. Although most of the variables in the regression are heterodox in nature, many can be given an interpretation in terms of the standard corporate finance literature. Therefore, in explaining the rationale for these variables and for their hypothesized signs, we do not attempt to present a grand new alternative theory or theories. Instead, we seek wherever possible to place them in the context of conventional theory, and to discuss the ways in which they depart from conventional theory.
__________________________________________________________________________
AGE is a standard measure of reputation in capital structure models. As a firm ages, it establishes itself as a continuing business and it therefore increases its capacity to take on more debt; hence age is positively related to debt. See Wiwattanakantang (1999) . In our data however, all MSEs started up at AGE=0 by construction. Therefore a negative sign may be likely in the AC regression, but in the IC regression, AGE is a retrospective variable whose sign is uncertain.
The next group of variables (WFEMALE, WOWNER, WUAGE, WFUAGE) are those which
give the basic ownership characteristics of gender, participation and age. These are included in the model to control for these basic characteristics of MSEs. There is little theoretical guidance as to the likely signs of the specifically gender-related variables. The estimated signs may provide a hint about possible discrimination, but since it is generally established in the literature that women in developing countries often make active use of informal financial schemes, such as ROSCAs, even this hypothesis is not very sharp. See Matin, Hulme and Rutherford (1999) . However, it would seem likely that under-age owners would have more difficulty obtaining credit than their older competitors, especially from outside the family, and we therefore suggest that WUAGE and WFUAGE are both likely to have a negative sign.
EDUC and TRAIN are educational variables and we would expect these to be positively related to debt on the grounds that better-educated owners would find it easier to present a plausible case for a loan to an outside body. This would be particularly important if the owner had no book-keeping knowledge. In the Kenyan context, OWNLAND and PERM are likely to have an important impact on any MSE's ability to borrow. Indeed, these variables can be interpreted within the corporate finance literature as measures of asset tangibility reflecting an enterprise's ability to provide collateral. However, it could also be argued that ownership of or ability to rent tangible assets is an indicator of wealth. Arguably, more wealthy individuals would be more likely to use their own equity, at least to start a business, possibly borrowing on their tangible assets when seeking additional capital. Thus the anticipated signs of OWNLAND and PERM are ambiguous.
FORMAL and BUSREGLA are indicators of the extent to which the business is an ongoing enterprise and not for example someone who makes irregular appearances by the roadside to wash car windscreens or a seasonal vendor of vegetables. As for OWNLAND and PERM, these variables may indicate an established business which is more easily able to borrow, or a business which is established because of the owner's wealth and which therefore has less need to borrow. On balance though, the former appears more plausible in this case, implying a possibly positive sign.
URBAN is included to check for the possibility that it is easier to obtain credit in urban areas.
However, we have no prior beliefs about this and the hypothesized sign is therefore ambiguous.
INC and SIZE can be interpreted as conventional corporate finance variables. Theory is again ambiguous in its guidance on the signs of these variables. Larger and more prosperous firms are probably more diversified and less risky (respectively) than smaller and less prosperous firms. This suggests they should use more debt and less equity, ceteris paribus. However, it is also argued that large firms are less transparent and therefore their borrowings cannot be monitored so easily, implying a lower debt ratio. High income may reflect high growth opportunities and may therefore also be associated with a lower debt ratio to reduce the risk that profitable investments may have to be passed over. See Prasad, Green and Murinde (2001) on these points. In the MSE contest these are relatively abstract points. However, there does exist the same ambiguity as before in that INC and SIZE could reflect either ability to borrow (high: suggesting a positive sign) or need to borrow (low: suggesting a negative sign).
GOOD and POOR provide more distinctively heterodox performance measures, judged not by income (which is not available for all companies in the sample), but by the owner's selfassessment. Since this assessment has much to do with the owner's view about whe ther (s)he is likely to be able to obtain a loan, we tentatively expect a positive sign on GOOD and negative on POOR.
KEEP refers to book-keeping. Proper bookkeeping will almost certainly improve the chances of the owner being able to borrow, and is a necessity for dealing with a formal financial institution. We could again interpret this variable in a corporate finance context as reflecting transparency. On either interpretation, the expected sign is positive.
Finally we control for the general type of activity in which the business is engaged. The survey provides a distinction between businesses engaged in primary activities (agriculture, forestry and fishing) and those in secondary (manufacturing and services). PRIMARY is a dummy for all businesses engaged in primary activities. The traditional literature would suggest that firms with less specialized capital are more able to borrow because they have lower bankruptcy costs. However, it is difficult to apply this idea directly to the relatively coarse classification available. We tentatively suggest that, in poor countries, capital in primary activities is likely to be more adaptable and have higher liquidation value than that in secondary activities. This would suggest a positive coefficient, but one could equally well argue that the reverse may be true.
Gearing
In the second part of the analysis we study the determinants of firms' gearing. Gearing is defined as the ratio of debt to debt-plus-equity outstanding at the time of the sample survey. It is important to re-emphasize that gearing as measured here is not simply an elaboration of the binary dependent variable in the debt versus equity regressions. The model of section 3.1 refers to the main source of a firm's capital. For this, we have categorical data, but not quantitative data. In this section we are concerned with a firm's total capital. For this we have quantitative data but not categorical data. See the discussion in section 2.2.
The model to be estimated has the same form as equation (1), except than y n is now to be interpreted as one of the gearing measures shown in table 2, and is not a binary variable. The independent variables are the same as before since we expect the same factors to influence gearing as influence the binary debt-equity decision. However, it is clear from table 2 that the gearing of MSEs is heavily concentrated at unity and (more particularly) at zero. Under 7% of the sample firms have both debt and equity outstanding according to the GEAR1 measure; under 4% according to GEAR2. To take account of the heavy weights at zero and unity, we used the two-limit Tobit model with truncation at zero and unity to estimate equation (1).
Maximum likelihood estimation was used. The likelihood function and its properties are set out in several standard texts, such as Maddala (1983) , ch. 6.
Success Rates of Loan Applications
In the third part of the analysis we concentrate on the 100 firms which applied for a loan during the one year prior to that in which the survey was undertaken. Specifically, we use the same explanatory variables as before to model the determinants of the "success rate" in the debt market, ie. the ratio of the loan received by a firm to the amount applied for. The general empirical set-up is the same as equation (1), except that y n is now the success ratio (SUCCR).
However, as is the case for gearing, a substantial proportion of the observations on y n in this sample are equal to either zero or unity (78% in total; see table 3). To take this into account, we again estimate the model using the two-limit Tobit estimator, with the limits set at zero and unity.
The SUCCR equation has to be interpreted somewhat differently from the four debt equations which we estimate (IC, AC, GEAR1 and GEAR2), even though the postulated explanatory variables are the same in all the equations. The debt equations might each be interpreted as demand functions for debt by individual firms, or perhaps as reduced-form estimates of the debt decision. However, the success rate of firms in the loan market depends in large part on the lender, although as we have argued and the literature emphasizes, lenders' decisions depend in their turn on the observable and inferred characteristics of borrowers (Freixas and Rochet, 1998 ). Thus we interpret the SUCCR equation as a (reduced-form) screening equation which describes loan outcomes as a function of firm characteristics. The anticipated signs of the coefficients are the same as in the debt equations because we postulate that the debt decison for MSEs will be intimately related to their chances of success in the loan market.
Empirical Results
We followed the same broad strategy in estimating the three models. First we estimated a general model, and then we tested down to a simplified model, deleting insignificant variables.
Given the qualitative nature of most of the data, we adopted a relatively cautious critical region of 25% for both the t -tests and the likelihood ratio tests 2 . Moreover, for the IC and AC equations we tested down two different routes, as we explain in section 4.1 below. For the record, table 5 gives the results of estimating the general model for all 5 equations: the debtequity decision (IC and AC), gearing (GEAR1 and GEAR2), and the success rate equation.
Only about one-sixth of the coefficients are significant in any of the equations, although this is to be expected given the rather general nature of the model, and that most of the variables are 1-0 dummies. FORMAL and GOOD appear to be significant in several of the models.
Nevertheless, we can see from the likelihood ratio tests in table 5 that, notwithstanding the low t statistics and correlation coefficients, each model as a whole does contribute significantly to explaining MSEs' financial decisions: debt-equity, gearing, and loan success rates. We therefore turn next to hypothesis testing which we discuss on a model-by-model basis. Table 5 __________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
Debt v Equity
The first step in hypothesis-testing was to examine how far decisions on initial capital could be differentiated from those on additional capital. We proceeded by testing the equality of coefficients on any given explanatory variable as between the IC and AC equations using ttests. We then used the likelihood ratio to test groups of coefficients accepted as being pairwise equal by the t-tests. To keep the presentation compact, Table 7 __________________________________________________________________________ In fact, an important feature of table 7 is that there are few major differences between the two versions of the debt-equity model, simplified along two different paths. The coefficients remaining in the model after simplification are surprisingly well-determined and tell a clear and interesting story about the determinants of the capital-raising decisions of Kenyan MSEs.
In both models, AGE appears to have a negative influence on the probability of incurring debt in the IC equation, and no impact in the AC equation. Since AGE is a retrospective variable in the IC equation, this implies that older firms were more likely to raise their initial capital in the form of equity. This suggests that borrowing has become a more viable option for firms established in the more recent past, in other words, that the availability of credit for small businesses has improved over time. EDUC is positively signed as expected, implying that more educated owners do have greater possibilities of borrowing. This is also true for TRAIN, although there are some differences between the two models as between IC and AC. Overall, the level of education appears to have an important positive impact on MSEs' debt-raising capacities. FAMILYB tends to be negatively associated with debt. Although this variable could have either sign, it is perhaps not surprising to find that small family-owned businesses are more likely to avoid debt. Indicators of tangibility (OWNLAND and PERM) are clearly important, and firms with these attributes are, as expected, generally more likely to incur debt, but for AC rather than IC where PERM has a counter-intuitive negative sign. It is noteworthy that FORMAL contributes positively to debt in the IC equation, but not in the AC equation.
This suggests that if an enterprise is not yet up and running, it is less likely to borrow if it is not constituted as a formal business, but once it is up and running, its formal status is immaterial to the debt decision. Finally, INC and GOOD are clearly very significant, with higher-income businesses more likely to incur debt, but firms which are self-assessed as above-average being less likely to incur debt. It is interesting that these two variables have opposite signs in all the equations. This suggests that there may be an important difference between MSEs' perceptions of their own relative performance and their actual absolute performance. Firms which are large in some absolute sense, measured by high net income, may have more debt. But, firms which perceive that they are performing well relative to their peers, have less debt.
Overall, variables which are indicative of the permanence of the business, the level of education of the owner, and general performance of the business seem to be most important in determining MSEs' debt-equity decisions, both for initial capital and additional capital.
Clearly, there are quantitative differences between the coefficients in the IC and AC equations, but there are no sign differences, although some variables do appear in one equation but not the other. This suggests that there are relatively few substantive qualitative differences among financing decisions, as between MSEs' business start-ups and established MSEs. If there are problems involved in start-ups, these results would suggest that, in general, they are also likely to be present for established businesses.
Gearing
Columns 3 and 4 of table 7 show the two simplified models of gearing. It is very striking and reassuring that almost all the same varibles which are significant in the IC and AC models are also significant in the gearing models. Moreover, all these variables have the same signs in the gearing models as they do in the IC and AC models: EDUC, TRAIN, FAMILYB, FORMAL, INC and GOOD. This strongly suggests that the model and the underlying influence of these variables on debt-equity and gearing decisions are both very robust. There are some differences. WFUAGE does not appear in the IC and AC models but it is present in the gearing model, and with a positive sign. This is hard to rationalize and and may just be an anomaly in the data. OWNLAND and PERM are in the IC and AC models, but do not appear in the gearing model. This is more reasonable as it suggests that tangibility is a factor in the debt-equity decision but not in the exact level of gearing which is decided on by the MSE. The nonappearance of AGE in the gearing equation is consistent with its non-appearance in the AC equation.
Loan applications and decisions
Finally, column 5 of surprising that there is therefore no effect of AGE on AC or on gearing. The negative effect of underage ownership (WUAGE) is also consistent with our hypotheses. Other signs are harder to rationalize however: the positive sign on WFUAGE, and the negative signs on BUSREGLA and on KEEP. The negative sign on PRIMARY is contrary to our tentative hypothesis, but this hypothesis was tentative and the negative sign may suggest that credit agencies view primary production as more risky than manufacturing.
Evidently there are some important similarities and differences as between the screening equation and the debt equations. OWNLAND and PERM are significant in SUCCR as well as in the debt-equity decision, suggesting that conventional tangibility factors are important in all aspects of debt decisions, from the point of view of both borrower and lender. It is also interesting that EDUC, TRAIN and INC are important in the overall debt-equity decision but not in the SUCCR equation. This, combined with the counter-intuitive signs on BUSREGLA and on KEEP in the SUCCR equation suggest that there may be an element of self-selection in loan applications. If in general, some education and book-keeping are regarded as a sine qua non for making a loan application, the decision as to whether to grant the loan and for how much, may depend on other factors. Alternatively, educated owners keeping regular accounts may be over-confident in their loan applications and apply for more than they can reasonably expect. Less-well educated owners with less formal businesses may be more cautious, and therefore enjoy a better success rate. Clearly there is more work to be done on this topic.
Concluding Remarks
Although our results must be regarded as preliminary, they emphasize four findings. 
Footnotes
1.
By "recent past" we mean the one year preceeding that in which the survey questions were asked. The success rate data are confined to those firms which applied for a loan during that period.
2.
The t tests were set up as two-tailed tests, and the ? 2 tests as one-tailed tests. total debt or equity = initial capital + additional capital GEAR1: Loans received in previous year added to debt data GEAR2: Loans received in previous year assumed to be included in debt data None: credit refused by lender Partial: credit granted but amount less than that applied for Full: credit granted equal to that applied for 2. For one business, there is data on the source of credit applied for but not on the amounts applied for or received. This business applied to a bank for credit, and for the purpose of this table it is assumed that the success rate of this business was "none". However, when modelling the determinants of the success rate, this business is excluded from the sample. The subscripts indicate the following: R = the equality of the pairwise coefficients in the IC and AC models was imposed I = the coefficient relates to the IC model A = the coefficient relates to the AC model See upper part of Table 6 See lower part of 
